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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 10-4458 
________________ 
 
JEFFREY A. DOCK, individually and as executor of the  
estate of Jeremy W. Dock; LINDA L. LONG, individually and as  
executor of the estate of Jeremy W. Dock,  
 
                                 Appellants 
v. 
 
RUTH RUSH; DONALD READE; DONALD CAMPBELL;  
RICK BLAIR, PSP Trooper; SNYDER COUNTY 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 4-09-cv-00606) 
District Judge:  The Honorable John E. Jones 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 27, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed June 22, 2011) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Jeffrey Dock and Linda Long, individually and as executors of the estate of 
Jeremy Dock, appeal the District Court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint 
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
 Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this 
case, we need not recite the factual or procedural background of this case, except insofar 
as is helpful to our discussion. 
I. 
 Jeremy Dock was assisting law enforcement authorities in an investigation into 
drug trafficking within the Snyder County, Pennsylvania prison.  For his own safety, he 
was being held in protective custody.  While in protective custody, Dock was found dead 
in his cell.  Prison officials maintain that Dock committed suicide.  Appellants believe he 
was killed by prison guards because he was cooperating with the authorities.  Appellants 
filed an action in the District Court raising First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 
claims, as well as state law claims sounding in negligence, survivorship and wrongful 
death.  Listed as defendants were Snyder County, Pennsylvania and several county 
officials: Ruth Rush, the warden of the Snyder County Prison; Donald Reade, the deputy 
warden; and Donald Campbell, the watch commander who found Dock’s body.  Also 
named as a defendant was Richard Blair, a Pennsylvania state trooper.  Blair was not 
alleged to have any role in Dock’s death, but conducted the subsequent investigation.1  
                                              
1
 In the District Court, Appellants argued that Trooper Blair owed them a duty to 
investigate the circumstances of Dock’s death under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Finding 
no support for this contention, the District Court dismissed Appellants’ claim against 
Trooper Blair.  On appeal, this claim has been neither identified as an issue nor argued in 
the brief.  An appellant is “required to set forth the issues raised on appeal and to present 
an argument in support of those issues in [his] opening brief.”  Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
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After giving the Appellants several opportunities to amend their complaint, the District 
Court dismissed all claims.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district 
court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted.  See Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  “In 
deciding a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken 
as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must 
be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  To withstand a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -
-- U.S. --- ,  129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly), 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007).  
III. 
 We start with the Appellants’ Eighth Amendment claim.  To state a claim for a 
violation under the Eighth Amendment, the Appellants must allege that the defendant 
acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  Deliberate indifference 
                                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); see FED. R.APP. P. 28(a)(5), (9).  “It is well settled that an 
appellant's failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of 
that issue on appeal.”  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
instant appeal presents no circumstances which counsel against application of that rule 
and we deem this issue waived. 
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requires that prison officials know of an excessive risk to an inmate’s health or safety and 
affirmatively disregard that risk.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.  The Appellants’ Eighth 
Amendment allegation fails because they are attempting to establish liability based on 
supervisory liability.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior, as a 
defendant must have personal involvement in a civil rights action).  Appellants do not 
allege that any of the Appellees had personal knowledge of any threats to Dock’s safety 
and subsequently acted with deliberate indifference.  After reviewing the District Court 
pleadings, the notice of appeal, and the parties’ responses, we cannot find any specific 
allegations in the complaint from which we can plausibly infer that the Appellees were 
deliberately indifferent to Dock’s safety.  See, e.g., Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed. 
 Further, the District Court correctly found the Appellants’ First Amendment 
claims to be flawed.  To prevail on a claim for retaliation by prison officials, a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered 
some “adverse action” by prison officials; and (3) his exercise of a constitutional right 
was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse action.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 
330, 333-34 (3d Cir.2001).  Here, the District Court correctly determined that Appellants 
properly alleged that Dock engaged in the protected activity of assisting law enforcement 
personnel with an investigation.  However, neither the Appellants’ original complaint, 
nor their subsequent amended version relate any factual allegations connecting Dock’s 
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death with this protected activity.  Indeed, no allegation is made that the Appellees took 
any action to retaliate against Dock for his cooperation in the criminal investigation. 
Therefore, for the same reasons, we agree with the District Court that Appellants failed to 
state claims upon which relief could be granted under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.   
IV. 
 Appellants next argue that the District Court erred in its determination that they 
failed to state a claim under Pennsylvania law.  We disagree.   
 The District Court correctly determined that the Pennsylvania Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8541-8542.  The Act provides that 
“no local agency shall be liable for any act of the local agency or employees thereof or 
any other person.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541.  Here, the Appellants have sued Snyder 
County, Pennsylvania, which is clearly a “local agency” under the Act and is, therefore, 
immune from suit. Moreover, the individual Appellees are also immune from suit under 
the Act.  “Municipal employees, including school district employees, are generally 
immune from liability to the same extent as their employing agency, so long as the act 
committed was within the scope of the employee’s employment.”  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 
F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8545).  Although there is an 
exception to this general rule, providing that employees are not immune from liability 
under § 8545 where their conduct amounts to “actual malice” or “willful misconduct,” no 
such conduct has been pleaded here.  Appellants have brought state law claims of 
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wrongful death, negligence and survivorship – none of which connote malicious or 
willful actions.  See Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006).   
V. 
 Lastly, Appellants maintain that the District Court erred by refusing them access 
to discovery before dismissing their amended complaint.  Appellants argue that our 
decision in Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004) and local practice in the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, give them the opportunity to conduct discovery before the 
District Court rules on a motion to dismiss.  True enough, we recognized in Alston that 
“in a civil rights action . . . the plaintiff may be disadvantaged by not having access to 
precisely who the relevant actors were, and their precise roles.”  Id. at 236. We held, 
therefore, that “perhaps access to some initial discovery would be advisable.”  Id.   Our 
decision in Alston reflected, among other things, our concern that the District Court had 
dismissed an initial complaint without leave to amend.  Id. at 235.  We specifically held 
that where a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a district 
court should permit curative amendment, provided to do so would not be an exercise in 
futility.  Id.  Here, we have no such concern given the fact that the District Court 
permitted such an amendment and was extraordinarily generous with the Appellants, 
permitting amendment even when the prescribed time for completing such a filing had 
passed.   
 As to the common practice of the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we are likewise 
unpersuaded by the Appellants’ argument.  While it may be common practice to permit 
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discovery while a partial motion to dismiss is pending, the motion to dismiss in this case 
would resolve the case in toto, making any delay for discovery inappropriate. 
 Finally, in dismissing the amended complaint, the District Court determined that it 
would be futile to permit further amendment.  See, e.g., Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 
118, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court has discretion to deny a request to amend if it 
is apparent from the record that . . . the amendment would be futile[.]”).  The record 
before the District Court included the Appellants’ original and amended complaints, 
exhibits, responses to the motion to dismiss and accompanying arguments.  The District 
Court was well-versed with Appellants’ allegations and gave them more than enough 
opportunities to supplement or clarify their allegations.  Given that, we find it reasonable 
for the District Court to conclude that the Appellants had presented their best allegations, 
and that any further amendment would not cure the deficiencies.  Accordingly, it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny leave to further amend and to dismiss 
Appellants’ complaint with prejudice. 
V. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the Appellants’ complaint. 
